The superiority illusion

Following up on my promise to cover a few papers about self-deception, the second in the series is about the superiority illusion (the first was about depressive realism).

Yamada et al. (2013) sought to uncover the origins of the ubiquitous belief that oneself is “superior to average people along various dimensions, such as intelligence, cognitive ability, and possession of desirable traits” (p. 4363). The sad statistical truth is the MOST people are average; that’s the whole definitions of ‘average’, really… But most people think they are superior to others.

Twenty-four young males underwent resting-state fMRI and PET scanning. The first scanner is of the magnetic resonance type and tracks where you have most of the blood going in the brain at any particular moment. More blood flow to a region is interpreted as that region being active at that moment.

The word ‘functional’ means that the subject is performing a task while in the scanner and the resultant brain image is correspondent to what the brain is doing at that particular moment in time. On the other hand, ‘resting-state’ means that the individual did not do any task in the scanner, s/he just sat nice and still on the warm pads listening to the various clicks, clacks, bangs & beeps the coils make. The subjects were instructed to rest with their eyes open. Good instruction, given than many subjects fall asleep in resting state MRI studies, even in the terrible racket that the coils make that sometimes can reach 125 Db. Let me explain: an MRI is a machine that generates a huge magnetic field (60,000 times stronger than Earth’s!) by shooting rapid pulses of electricity through a coiled wire, called gradient coil. These pulses of electricity or, in other words, the rapid on-off switchings of the electrical current make the gradient coil vibrate very loudly.

A PET scanner functions on a different principle. The subject receives a shot of a radioactive substance (called tracer) and the machine tracks its movement through the subject’s body. In this experiment’s case, the tracer was raclopride, a D2 dopamine receptor antagonist.

The behavioral data, meaning the questionnaires results showed that, curiously, the superiority illusion belief was not correlated with anxiety or self-esteem scores, but, not curiously, it was negatively correlated with helplessness, a measure of depression. Makes sense, especially from the view of depressive realism.

The imaging data suggests that dopamine binding on its striatal D2 receptors attenuate the functional connectivity between the left sensoriomotor striatum (SMST, a.k.a postcommissural putamen) and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (daCC). And this state of affairs gives rise to the superiority illusion (see Fig. 1).

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Fig. 1. The superiority illusion arises from the suppression of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (daCC) – putamen functional connection by the dopamine coming from the substantia nigra/ ventral tegmental area complex (SN/VTA) and binding to its D2 striatal receptors. Credits: brain diagram; Wikipedia, other brain structures and connections: Neuronicus, data: Yamada et al. (2013, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1221681110). Overall: Public Domain

This was a frustrating paper. I cannot tell if it has methodological issues or is just poorly written. For instance, I have to assume that the dACC they’re talking about is bilateral and not ipsilateral to their SMST, meaning left. As a non-native English speaker myself I guess I should cut the authors a break for consistently misspelling ‘commissure’ or for other grammatical errors for fear of being accused of hypocrisy, but here you have it: it bugged me. Besides, mine is a blog and theirs is a published peer-reviewed paper. (Full Disclosure: I do get editorial help from native English speakers when I publish for real and, except a few personal style quirks, I fully incorporate their suggestions). So a little editorial help would have gotten a long way to make the reading more pleasant. What else? Ah, the results are not clearly explained anywhere, it looks like the authors rely on obviousness, a bad move if you want to be understood by people slightly outside your field. From the first figure it looks like only 22 subjects out of 24 showed superiority illusion but the authors included 24 in the imaging analyses, or so it seems. The subjects were 23.5 +/- 4.4 years, meaning that not all subjects had the frontal regions of the brain fully developed: there are clear anatomical and functional differences between a 19 year old and a 27 year old.

I’m not saying it is a bad paper because I have covered bad papers; I’m saying it was frustrating to read it and it took me a while to figure out some things. Honestly, I shouldn’t even have covered it, but I spent some precious time going through it and its supplementals, what with me not being an imaging dude, so I said the hell with it, I’ll finish it; so here you have it :).

By Neuronicus, 13 December 2017

REFERENCE: Yamada M, Uddin LQ, Takahashi H, Kimura Y, Takahata K, Kousa R, Ikoma Y, Eguchi Y, Takano H, Ito H, Higuchi M, Suhara T (12 Mar 2013). Superiority illusion arises from resting-state brain networks modulated by dopamine. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 110(11):4363-4367. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1221681110. ARTICLE | FREE FULLTEXT PDF 

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The FIRSTS: The roots of depressive realism (1979)

There is a rumor stating that depressed people see the world more realistically and the rest of us are – to put it bluntly – deluded optimists. A friend of mine asked me if this is true. It took me a while to find the origins of this claim, but after I found it and figured out that the literature has a term for the phenomenon (‘depressive realism’), I realized that there is a whole plethora of studies on the subject. So the next following posts will be centered, more or less, on the idea of self-deception.

It was 1979 when Alloy & Abramson published a paper who’s title contained the phrase ‘Sadder but Wiser’, even if it was followed by a question mark. The experiments they conducted are simple, but the theoretical implications are large.

The authors divided several dozens of male and female undergraduate students into a depressed group and a non-depressed group based on their Beck Depression Inventory scores (a widely used and validated questionnaire for self-assessing depression). Each subject “made one of two possible responses (pressing a button or not pressing a button) and received one of two possible outcomes (a green light or no green light)” (p. 447). Various conditions presented the subjects with various degrees of control over what the button does, from 0 to 100%. After the experiments, the subjects were asked to estimate their control over the green light, how many times the light came on regardless of their behavior, what’s the percentage of trials on which the green light came on when they pressed or didn’t press the button, respectively, and how did they feel. In some experiments, the subjects were wining or losing money when the green light came on.

Verbatim, the findings were that:

“Depressed students’ judgments of contingency were surprisingly accurate in all four experiments. Nondepressed students, on the other hand, overestimated the degree of contingency between their responses and outcomes when noncontingent outcomes were frequent and/or desired and underestimated the degree of contingency when contingent outcomes were undesired” (p. 441).

In plain English, it means that if you are not depressed, when you have some control and bad things are happening, you believe you have no control. And when you have no control but good things are happening, then you believe you have control. If you are depressed, it does not matter, you judge your level of control accurately, regardless of the valence of the outcome.

Such illusion of control is a defensive mechanism that surely must have adaptive value by, for example, allowing the non-depressed to bypass a sense of guilt when things don’t work out and increase self-esteem when they do. This is fascinating, particularly since it is corroborated by findings that people receiving gambling wins or life successes like landing a good job, rewards that at least in one case are demonstrably attributable to chance, believe, nonetheless, that it is due to some personal attributes that make them special, that makes them deserving of such rewards. (I don’t remember the reference of this one so don’t quote me on it. If I find it, I’ll post it, it’s something about self-entitlement, I think). That is not to say that life successes are not largely attributable to the individual; they are. But, statistically speaking, there must be some that are due to chance alone, and yet most people feel like they are the direct agents for changes in luck.

Another interesting point is that Alloy & Abramson also tried to figure out how exactly their subjects reasoned when they asserted their level of control through some clever post-experiment questioners. Long story short (the paper is 45 pages long), the illusion of control shown by nondepressed subjects in the no control condition was the result of incorrect logic, that is, faulty reasoning.

In summary, the distilled down version of depressive realism that non-depressed people see the world through rose-colored glasses is slightly incorrect. Because only in particular conditions this illusion of control applies, and that is overestimation of control only when good things are happening and underestimation of control when bad things are happening.

Of course, it has been over 40 years since the publication of this paper and of course it has its flaws. Many replications and replications with caveats and meta-analyses and reviews and opinions and alternative hypotheses have been confirmed and infirmed and then confirmed again with alterations, so there is still a debate out there about the causes/ functions/ ubiquity/ circumstantiality of the depressive realism effect. One thing seems to be constant though: the effect exists.

I will leave you with the ponders of Alloy & Abramson (1979):

“A crucial question is whether depression itself leads people to be “realistic” or whether realistic people are more vulnerable to depression than other people” (p. 480).

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REFERENCE: Alloy LB, & Abramson LY (Dec. 1979). Judgment of contingency in depressed and nondepressed students: sadder but wiser? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 108(4): 441-485. PMID: 528910. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.108.4.441. ARTICLE | FULLTEXT PDF via ResearchGate

By Neuronicus, 30 November 2017

Play-based or academic-intensive?

preschool - CopyThe title of today’s post wouldn’t make any sense for anybody who isn’t a preschooler’s parent or teacher in the USA. You see, on the west side of the Atlantic there is a debate on whether a play-based curriculum for a preschool is more advantageous than a more academic-based one. Preschool age is 3 to 4 years;  kindergarten starts at 5.

So what does academia even looks like for someone who hasn’t mastered yet the wiping their own behind skill? I’m glad you asked. Roughly, an academic preschool program is one that emphasizes math concepts and early literacy, whereas a play-based program focuses less or not at all on these activities; instead, the children are allowed to play together in big or small groups or separately. The first kind of program has been linked with stronger cognitive benefits, while the latter with nurturing social development. The supporters of one program are accusing the other one of neglecting one or the other aspect of the child’s development, namely cognitive or social.

The paper that I am covering today says that it “does not speak to the wider debate over learning-through-play or the direct instruction of young children. We do directly test whether greater classroom time spent on academic-oriented activities yield gains in both developmental domains” (Fuller et al., 2017, p. 2). I’ll let you be the judge.

Fuller et al. (2017) assessed the cognitive and social benefits of different programs in an impressive cohort of over 6,000 preschoolers. The authors looked at many variables:

  • children who attended any form of preschool and children who stayed home;
  • children who received more (high dosage defined as >20 hours/week) and less preschool education (low dosage defined as <20 hour per week);
  • children who attended academic-oriented preschools (spent at least 3 – 4 times a week on each of the following tasks: letter names, writing, phonics and counting manipulatives) and non-academic preschools.

The authors employed a battery of tests to assess the children’s preliteracy skills, math skills and social emotional status (i.e. the independent variables). And then they conducted a lot of statistical analyses in the true spirit of well-trained psychologists.

The main findings were:

1) “Preschool exposure [of any form] has a significant positive effect on children’s math and preliteracy scores” (p. 6).school-1411719801i38 - Copy

2) The earlier the child entered preschool, the stronger the cognitive benefits.

3) Children attending high-dose academic-oriented preschools displayed greater cognitive proficiencies than all the other children (for the actual numbers, see Table 7, pg. 9).

4) “Academic-oriented preschool yields benefits that persist into the kindergarten year, and at notably higher magnitudes than previously detected” (p. 10).

5) Children attending academic-oriented preschools displayed no social development disadvantages than children that attended low or non-academic preschool programs. Nor did the non-academic oriented preschools show an improvement in social development (except for Latino children).

Now do you think that Fuller et al. (2017) gave you any more information in the debate play vs. academic, given that their “findings show that greater time spent on academic content – focused on oral language, preliteracy skills, and math concepts – contributes to the early learning of the average child at magnitudes higher than previously estimated” (p. 10)? And remember that they did not find any significant social advantages or disadvantages for any type of preschool.

I realize (or hope, rather) that most pre-k teachers are not the Draconian thou-shall-not-play-do-worksheets type, nor are they the let-kids-play-for-three-hours-while-the-adults-gossip-in-a-corner types. Most are probably combining elements of learning-through-play and directed-instruction in their programs. Nevertheless, there are (still) programs and pre-k teachers that clearly state that they employ play-based or academic-based programs, emphasizing the benefits of one while vilifying the other. But – surprise, surprise! – you can do both. And, it turns out, a little academia goes a long way.

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So, next time you choose a preschool for your kid, go with the data, not what your mommy/daddy gut instinct says and certainly be very wary of preschool officials that, when you ask them for data to support their curriculum choice, tell you that that’s their ‘philosophy’, they don’t need data. Because, boy oh boy, I know what philosophy means and it aint’s that.

By Neuronicus, 12 October 2017

Reference: Fuller B, Bein E, Bridges M, Kim, Y, & Rabe-Hesketh, S. (Sept. 2017). Do academic preschools yield stronger benefits? Cognitive emphasis, dosage, and early learning. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 52: 1-11, doi: 10.1016/j.appdev.2017.05.001. ARTICLE | New York Times cover | Reading Rockets cover (offers a fulltext pdf) | Good cover and interview with the first author on qz.com

Scientists don’t know the risks & benefits of science

If you want to find out how bleach works or what keeps the airplanes in the air or why is the rainbow the same sequence of colors or if it’s dangerous to let your kid play with snails would you ask a scientist or your local priest?

The answer is very straightforward for most of the people. Just that for a portion of the people the straightforwardness is viewed by the other portion as corkscrewedness. Or rather just plain dumb.

Cacciatore et al. (2016) asked about 5 years ago 2806 American adults how much they trust the information provided by religious organizations, university scientists, industry scientists, and science/technology museums. They also asked them about their age, gender, race, socioeconomic status, income as well as about Facebook use, religiosity, ideology, and attention to science-y content.

Almost 40% of the sample described themselves as Evangelical Christians, one of the largest religious group in USA. These people said they trust more their religious organizations then scientists (regardless of who employs these scientists) to tell the truth about the risks and benefits of technologies and their applications.

The data yielded more information, like the fact that younger, richer, liberal, and white people tended to trust scientists more then their counterparts. Finally, Republicans were more likely to report a religious affiliation than Democrats.

I would have thought that everybody would prefer to take advice about science from a scientist. Wow, what am I saying, I just realized what I typed… Of course people are taking health advice from homeopaths all the time, from politicians rather than environment scientists, from alternative medicine quacks than from doctors, from no-college educated than geneticists. From this perspective then, the results of this study are not surprising, just very very sad… I just didn’t think that the gullible people can also be grouped by political affiliations. I though the affliction is attacking both sides of an ideological isle in a democratic manner.

Of course, this is a survey study, therefore a lot more work is needed to properly generalize these results, from expanding the survey sections (beyond the meager 1 or 2 questions per section) to validation and replication. Possibly, even addressing different aspects of science because, for instance, climate change is a much more touchy subject than, say, apoptosis. And replace or get rid of the “Scientists know best what is good for the public” item; seriously, I don’t know any scientist, including me, who would answer yes to that question. Nevertheless, the trend is, like I said, sad.

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Reference:  Cacciatore MA, Browning N, Scheufele DA, Brossard D, Xenos MA, & Corley EA. (Epub ahead of print 25 Jul 2016). Opposing ends of the spectrum: Exploring trust in scientific and religious authorities. Public Understanding of Science. PMID: 27458117, DOI: 10.1177/0963662516661090. ARTICLE | NPR cover

By Neuronicus, 7 December 2016

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Earliest memories

I found a rather old-ish paper which attempts to settle a curiosity regarding human memory: how far back can we remember?

MacDonald et al. (2000) got 96 participants to fill a 15-minute questionnaire about their demographics and their earliest memories. The New Zealand subjects were in their early twenties, a third of Maori descent, a third of European descent and the last third of Asian descent.

The Maori had the earliest memories, some of them as early as before they turned 1 year old, though the mean was 2 years and 8 months. Next came the Europeans with the mean of 3 years and a half, followed by the Asians with the mean of 4 and 9 months. Overall, most memories seem to occur between 3 and 4 years. There was no difference in gender except for the Asian group where the females reported much later memories, around 6 years.

The subjects were also required to indicate the source of the memory as being personal recollection, family story or photographs. About 86% reported it as personal recollection. The authors argue that even without the remaining 14% the results looks the same. I personally would have left those 14% out if they really don’t make a difference, it would have made the results much neater.

There are a few caveats that one must keep in mind with this kind of studies, the questionnaire studies. One of them is the inherent veracity problem: you rely on human honesty because there is no way to check the data for truth. The fact that the memory may be true or false would not matter for this study, but whether is a personal recollection or a family story would matter. So take the results at face value. Besides, human memory is extremely easy to manipulate, therefore some participants may actually believe that they ‘remember’ an event when in fact it was learned much later from relatives. I also have very early memories and while one of them I believe was told ad nauseam by family members at every family gathering so many times that I incorporated it as actual recollection, there are a couple that I couldn’t tell you for the life of me whether I remember them truly or they too have been subjected to family re-reminiscing.

Another issue might be the very small sample sizes with sub-groups. The authors divided their participants in many subgroups (whether they spoke English first, whether they were raised mainly by the mother etc.) that some subgroups ended up having 2 or 3 members, which is not enough to make a statistical judgement. Which also leads me to multiple comparisons adjustments, which should be more visible.

So not exactly the best paper ever written. Nevertheless, it’s an interesting paper in that even if it doesn’t really establish (in my opinion) when do most people have their earliest true memories, it does point to cultural differences in individuals’ earliest recollections. The authors speculate that that may be due to the emphasis put on detailed stories about personal experiences told by the mother in the early years in some cultures (here Maori) versus a lack of these stories in other cultures (here Asian).

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Reference: MacDonald S, Uesiliana K, & Hayne H. (Nov 2000). Cross-cultural and gender differences in childhood amnesia. Memory. 2000 Nov;8(6):365-76. PMID: 11145068, DOI: 10.1080/09658210050156822. ARTICLE | FULLTEXT PDF

By Neuronicus, 28 November 2016

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Video games and depression

There’s a lot of talk these days about the harm or benefit of playing video games, a lot of time ignoring the issue of what kind of video games we’re talking about.

Merry et al. (2012) designed a game for helping adolescents with depression. The game is called SPARX (Smart, Positive, Active, Realistic, X-factor thoughts) and is based on the cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) principles.

CBT has been proven to be more efficacious that other forms of therapy, like psychoanalysis, psychodynamic, transpersonal and so on in treating (or at least alleviating) a variety of mental disorders, from depression to anxiety, form substance abuse to eating disorders. Its aim is to identify maladaptive thoughts (the ‘cognitive’ bit) and behaviors (the ‘behavior’ bit), change those thoughts and behaviors in order to feel better. It is more active and more focused than other therapies, in the sense that during the course of a CBT session, the patient and therapist discuss one problem and tackle it.

SPARX is a simple interactive fantasy game with 7 levels (Cave, Ice, Volcano, Mountain, Swamp, Bridgeland, Canyon) and the purpose is to fight the GNATs (Gloomy Negative Automatic Thoughts) by mastering several techniques, like breathing and progressive relaxation and acquiring skills, like scheduling and problem solving. You can customize your avatar and you get a guide throughout the game that also assess your progress and gives you real-life quests, a. k. a. therapeutic homework. If the player does not show the expected improvements after each level, s/he is directed to seek help from a real-life therapist. Luckily, the researchers also employed the help of true game designers, so the game looks at least half-decent and engaging, not a lame-worst-graphic-ever-bleah sort of thing I was kind of expecting.

To see if their game helps with depression, Merry et al. (2012) enrolled in an intervention program 187 adolescents (aged between 12-19 years) that sought help for depression; half of the subjects played the game for about 4 – 7 weeks, and the other half did traditional CBT with a qualified therapist for the same amount of time.  The patients have been assessed for depression at regular intervals before, during and after the therapy, up to 3 months post therapy. The conclusion?

SPARX “was at least as good as treatment as usual in primary healthcare sites in New Zealand” (p. 8)

Not bad for an RPG! The remission rates were higher for the SPARX group that in treatment as usual group. Also, the majority of participants liked the game and would recommend it. Additionally, SPARX was more effective than CBT for people who were less depressed than the ones who scored higher on the depression scales.

And now, coming back to my intro point, the fact that this game seems to be beneficial does not mean all of them are. There are studies that show that some games have deleterious effects on the developing brain. In the same vein, the fact that some shoddy company sells games that are supposed to boost your brain function (I always wandered which function…) that doesn’t mean they are actually good for you. Without the research to back up the claims, anybody can say anything and it becomes a “Buyer Beware!” game. They may call it cognitive enhancement, memory boosters or some other brainy catch phrase, but without the research to back up the claims, it’s nothing but placebo in the best case scenario. So it gives me hope – and great pleasure – that some real psychologists at a real university are developing a video game and then do the necessary research to validate it as a helping tool before marketing it.

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Oh, an afterthought: this paper is 4 years old so I wondered what happened in the meantime, is it on the market or what? On the research databases I couldn’t find much, except that it was tested this year on Dutch population with pretty much similar results. But Wikipedia tells us that is was released in 2013 and is free online for New Zealanders! The game’s website says it may become available to other countries as well.

Reference: Merry SN, Stasiak K, Shepherd M, Frampton C, Fleming T, & Lucassen MF. (18 Apr 2012). The effectiveness of SPARX, a computerised self help intervention for adolescents seeking help for depression: randomised controlled non-inferiority trial. The British Medical Journal, 344:e2598. doi: 10.1136/bmj.e2598. PMID: 22517917, PMCID: PMC3330131. ARTICLE | FREE FULLTEXT PDF  | Wikipedia page | Watch the authors talk about the game

By Neuronicus, 15 October 2016

The FIRSTS: Theory of Mind in non-humans (1978)

Although any farmer or pet owner throughout the ages would probably agree that animals can understand the intentions of their owners, not until 1978 has this knowledge been scientifically proven.

Premack & Woodruff (1978) performed a very simple experiment in which they showed videos to a female adult chimpanzee named Sarah involving humans facing various problems, from simple (can’t reach a banana) to complex (can’t get out of the cage). Then, the chimps were shown pictures of the human with the tool that solved the problem (a stick to reach the banana, a key for the cage) along with pictures where the human was performing actions that were not conducive to solving his predicament. The experimenter left the room while the chimp made her choice. When she did, she rang a bell to summon the experimenter back in the room, who then examined the chimp’s choice and told the chimp whether her choice was right or wrong. Regardless of the choice, the chimp was awarded her favorite food. The chimp’s choices were almost always correct when the actor was its favourite trainer, but not so much when the actor was a person she disliked.

Because “no single experiment can be all things to all objections, but the proper combination of results from [more] experiments could decide the issue nicely” (p. 518), the researchers did some more experiments which were variations of the first one designed to figure out what the chimp was thinking. The authors go on next to discuss their findings at length in the light of two dominant theories of the time, mentalism and behaviorism, ruling in favor of the former.

Of course, the paper has some methodological flaws that would not pass the rigors of today’s reviewers. That’s why it has been replicated multiple times in more refined ways. Nor is the distinction between behaviorism and cognitivism a valid one anymore, things being found out to be, as usual, more complex and intertwined than that. Thirty years later, the consensus was that chimps do indeed have a theory of mind in that they understand intentions of others, but they lack understanding of false beliefs (Call & Tomasello, 2008).

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References:

1. Premack D & Woodruff G (Dec. 1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1 (4): 515-526. DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X00076512. ARTICLE

2. Call J & Tomasello M (May 2008). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(5): 187-192. PMID: 18424224 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.010. ARTICLE  | FULLTEXT PDF

By Neuronicus, 20 August 2016

Cats and uncontrollable bursts of rage in humans

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That many domestic cats carry the parasite Toxoplasma gondii is no news. Nor is the fact that 30-50% of the global population is infected with it, mainly as a result of contact with cat feces.

The news is that individuals with toxoplasmosis are a lot more likely to have episodes of uncontrollable rage. It was previously known that toxoplasmosis is associated with some psychological disturbances, like personality changes or cognitive impairments. In this new longitudinal study (that means a study that spanned more than a decade) published three days ago, Coccaro et al. (2016) tested 358 adults with or without psychiatric disorders for toxoplasmosis. They also submitted the subjects to a battery of psychological tests for anxiety, impulsivity, aggression, depression, and suicidal behavior.

The results showed that the all the subjects who were infected with T. gondii had higher scores on aggression, regardless of their mental status. Among the people with toxoplasmosis, the aggression scores were highest in the patients previously diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder, a little lower in patients with non-aggressive psychiatric disorders, and finally lower (but still significantly higher than non-infected people) in healthy people.

The authors are adamant in pointing out that this is a correlational study, therefore no causality direction can be inferred. So don’t kick out you felines just yet. However, as CDC points out, a little more care when changing the cat litter or a little more vigorous washing of the kitchen counters would not hurt anybody and may protect against T. gondii infection.

Reference: Coccaro EF, Lee R, Groer MW, Can A, Coussons-Read M, & Postolache TT (23 march 2016). Toxoplasma gondii Infection: Relationship With Aggression in Psychiatric Subjects. The Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 77(3): 334-341. doi: 10.4088/JCP.14m09621. Article Abstract | FREE Full Text | The Guardian cover

By Neuronicus, 26 March 2016

Younger children in a grade are more likely to be diagnosed with ADHD

AHDH immaturity - Copy.jpgA few weeks ago I was drawing attention to the fact that some children diagnosed with ADHD do not have attention deficits. Instead, a natural propensity for seeking more stimulation may have led to overdiagnosing and overmedicating these kids.

Another reason for the dramatic increase in ADHD diagnosis over the past couple of decades may stem in the increasingly age-inappropriate demands that we place on children. Namely, children in the same grade can be as much as 1 year apart in chronological age, but at these young ages 1 year means quite a lot in terms of cognitive and behavioral development. So if we put a standard of expectations based on how the older children behave, then the younger children in the same grade would fall short of these standards simply because they are too immature to live up to them.

So what does the data say? Two studies, Morrow et al. (2012) and Chen et al. (2016) checked to see if the younger children in a given grade are more likely to be diagnosed with ADHD and/or medicated. The first study was conducted in almost 1 million Canadian children, aged 6-12 years and the second investigated almost 400,000 Taiwanese children, aged 4-17 years.

In Canada, the cut-off for starting school in Dec. 31. Which means that in the first grade, a child born in January is almost a year older that a child born in December. Morrow et al. (2012) concluded that the children born in December were significantly more likely to receive a diagnosis of ADHD than those born in January (30% more likely for boys and 70% for girls). Moreover, the children born in December were more likely to be given an ADHD medication prescription (41% more likely for boys and 77% for girls).

In Taiwan, the cut-off date for starting school in August 31. Similar to the Canadian study, Chen et al. (2016) found that the children born in August were more likely to be diagnosed with ADHD and receive ADHD medication than the children born in September.

Now let’s be clear on one thing: ADHD is no trivial matter. It is a real disorder. It’s an incredibly debilitating disease for both children and their parents. Impulsivity, inattention and hyperactivity are the hallmarks of almost every activity the child engages in, leading to very poor school performance (the majority cannot get a college degree) and hard family life, plus a lifetime of stigma that brings its own “gifts” such as marginalization, loneliness, depression, anxiety, poor eating habits, etc.

The data presented above favors the “immaturity hypothesis” which posits that the behaviors expected out of some children cannot be performed not because something is wrong with them, but because they are simply too immature to be able to perform those behaviors. That does not mean that every child diagnosed with ADHD will just grow out of it; the researchers just point to the fact that ignoring the chronological age of the child coupled with prematurely entering a highly stressful and demanding system as school might lead to ADHD overdiagnosis.

Bottom line: ignoring the chronological age of the child might explain some of increase in prevalence of ADHD by overdiagnostication (in US alone, the rise is from 6% of children diagnosed with ADHD in 2000 to 11-15% in 2015).

References:

  1. Morrow RL, Garland EJ, Wright JM, Maclure M, Taylor S, & Dormuth CR. (17 Apr 2012, Epub 5 Mar 2012). Influence of relative age on diagnosis and treatment of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder in children. Canadian Medical Association Journal, 184 (7), 755-762, doi: 10.1503/cmaj.111619. Article | FREE PDF 
  1. Chen M-H, Lan W-H, Bai Y-M, Huang K-L, Su T-P, Tsai S-J, Li C-T, Lin W-C, Chang W-H, & Pan T-L, Chen T-J, & Hsu J-W. (10 Mar 2016). Influence of Relative Age on Diagnosis and Treatment of Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in Taiwanese Children. The Journal of Pediatrics [Epub ahead print]. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpeds.2016.02.012 Article | FREE PDF

By Neuronicus, 14 March 2016

Learning chess can improve math skills

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Twenty-two years ago to the day, on January 30, 1994, Peter Leko became the world’s youngest chess grandmaster, at the age of 14.

A proficiency in chess is often linked with higher intelligence, that is, the more intelligent you are, the more likely to be good at chess. This assumption has roots probably in the observation that chess does not allow for random chance or physical attributes, as most games do. So it follows that of you are good at it, it must be… intelligence, although there are at least an equal number of studies if not more that show that practice has more an impact on your chess ability that your native IQ score.

Personally, as one that always looks askance whenever there is talk about intelligence quotient and intelligence tests, I have serious doubts that any of these papers measured what they claimed they measured. And that is because I find the construct “intelligence” poorly defined and, as a direct consequence, hard to measure.

That being said, Sala et al. (2015) wanted to see if chess practice can enhance mathematical problem-solving abilities in young students. The authors divided 560 pupils (8 to 11 years old) into two groups: one group received chess training for 10-15 hours (1 or 2 hours per week) and an option to use a chess program, while the other group did not participate in any chess activities. The experiment took 3 months.

Both groups were tested before and after training with a mathematical problem-solving test battery and a chess ability test.

“Results show a strong correlation between chess and math scores, and a higher improvement in math in the experimental group compared with the control group. These results foster the hypothesis that even a short-time practice of chess in children can be a useful tool to enhance their mathematical abilities.” (Sala et al. (2015, Abstract).

This is all nice and well, were it not for the fact that their experimental group had significantly more pupils that already knew how to play chess (193 out of 309, 62%) compared to the control group (72 out of 251, 29%). To give credit to the authors, they acknowledge this limitation of the study, but, surprisingly, they do not run their stats without the “I-already-know-chess” subjects….

Nevertheless, even if the robustness and the arguments are a little on the shoddy side, the paper points to a possible fruitful line of research: that of additional tools to improve school performance by incorporating game and playtime into the instructors’ and parents’ teaching arsenal.

Reference: Sala G, Gorini A, & Pravettoni G (23 July 2015). Mathematical Problem-Solving Abilities and Chess. An Experimental Study on Young Pupils. SAGE Open, 1-9. DOI: 10.1177/2158244015596050. Article | FREE FULLTEXT PDF

By Neuronicus, 30 January 2016